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 
 
“Capital as power: Toward a new cosmology of capitalism” – Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan 
Nitzan http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue61/BichlerNitzan61.pdf 
 
Perhaps people should read that paper, of only 20 pages or so, before reading on below. 
 
Here is a key quote from the paper: 
 
“Political economy, liberal as well as Marxist, stands on three key foundations: (I) a sep-
aration between economics and politics; (II) a Galilean/Cartesian/Newtonian mechanical un-
derstanding of the economy; and (III) a value theory that breaks the economy into two spheres 
– real and nominal – and that uses the quantities of the real sphere to explain the appearances 
of the nominal one.” 
I think Bichler and Nitzan are on the right track in a number of ways but I still do have 
some key disagreements with them. To illustrate these disagreements I will re-write the state-
ment above in what I regard as the more correct form. 
“Conventional economics stands on three key foundations: (I) a separation between eco-
nomics and politics; (II) a Cartesian/Newtonian mechanical understanding of the economy; 
and (III) a value theory that breaks the economy into two spheres – real and nominal – that 
uses the quantities of the real sphere to explain the appearances of the nominal one (ideological 
justification) and that then uses the quantities of the nominal sphere to manage those of the 
real sphere (as an instrumental, formalised reason system for the purpose of deriving, in a 
sense, quantised values for the real).”  
To explain these changes; 
(I) By definition, political economy does not separate economics and politics. Even using 
the original definition of political economy which meant national economy, the operations of 
government and politics are implicit in the definition. It is conventional economics which ar-
tificially separates the complexly conjoined, but far from identical, “twin” spheres of politics 
and economics. Political economy in general and Marxism in particular attempt to deal with 
the entire twinned system. This is not to say that any existing form of political economy, 
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including Marxism, has fully investigated and properly explicated the “cosmology” of this 
twinned system. Indeed, they have not. 
(II) This point is clearer if only Cartesian-ism and Newtonian mechanics (classical physics) 
are mentioned. The issue with Cartesian-ism is (substance) dualism which is very arguably a 
fallacious metaphysics and ontology. The argument is a long one of which more later, at an-
other time. Suffice it to say here that modern physics and complex system science lend weight 
to the stance of a form of Priority Monism which we might term Complex System Monism 
where the whole known system (the cosmos) is prior to its parts. Its “parts” in turn are sub-
systems which can include, or rather exhibit, emergent and evolutionary complexity. The 
problem with taking the viewpoint of Newtonian mechanistic physics (and the mathematics 
which goes with it) is in the very application of mechanistic science (and maths) to complex 
emergent and evolutionary systems. Conventional economics remains, for the most part, 
mired in mechanistic and deterministic models. These are wholly inadequate for complex 
emergent and evolutionary systems. 
(III) It is true that conventional (classical) value theory, even Marxist value theory, breaks 
the economy into two spheres – real and nominal. However, classical theory is not quite so 
bereft of analytical and pragmatic use in this arena as is suggested by Bichler and Nitzan. The 
market, however constituted and however imperfect, is the social and economic instrument of 
measurement of real value in nominally comparable value terms. How good, representative, 
true or useful the nominally comparable value terms are is another question. Individual hu-
mans, as agents, are the agent-actuators of the collective instrument that is the market. The 
market is a collective and cooperative instrument that is used for the competitive game or 
rather the pseudo-competitive quasi-rigged game of market economics. This fits within the 
theory of cooperative-competitive games. Of course, it is still possible, at least in theory, that 
we could find a better instrument than the market. It is is also possible that we might not. 
Breaking the world into real and nominal spheres (or sometimes real and virtual spheres) 
is something we humans do all the time. It is not unique to classical economics. Every idea-
tional system, every mathematical system is a model or map (in nominal or formal form) of 
the real world. Every interaction of a human agent (a human being) with the real world (the 
physical or material external world in substance philosophy terms) is mediated and managed 
by our mental models. Even our sensory data is modeled in the brain into a virtual represen-
tation (in the brain) of all that which we sense. This virtual representation is a model or a set 
of models. Modelling is the way, the entire way, in which the human agent (the human person) 
interacts with the world in any purposive, endogenously directed fashion: modeling and mod-
eling only. 
In the above sense, the broad agent model of modern economics is not wrong, not mis-
conceived. We model values and we build cooperative-competitive instruments (markets) to 
collectively model economic values as a community. There are of course other ways to model 
values from religion to moral philosophy to science (oftentimes these are widely differing kinds 
of values of course). 
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However the representative agent model is wrong or inadequate in two specific ways. In-
dividual agents (humans) are dissimilar enough, because of their internal complexity and com-
plexities of their individual histories of socialisation, that they cannot be validly aggregated in 
many ways. Also, the representative agent model takes no proper cognizance of emergent be-
haviors. 
Where all this ontological investigation and theorising gets us is not clear at this stage. The 
investigation, theory and testable theories (hopefully) would have to be carried on and devel-
oped. But certainly it is necessary to return to ontology (what is real, how it is real and how 
do these real things or real processes interact?) before we solve (partially but more than so far 
solved) the “wicked” problem of economics, or rather of political economy. 
My main criticism of conventional economics and even of Marxism and Capital as Power 
theorising is that they are all too incomplete and none of them has yet developed a consistent 
and supportable ontology. They can never be completed of course but surely they can be ex-
tended further than their current development. The way to do this is to return to ontology as I 
say. If we don’t get the basic ontology right we will get nothing else right. 
 
 
 
[. . .] I think Bichler and Nitzan’s approach is very interesting and useful. I am however a little 
puzzled by their rigid insistence that “Capitalism is not a mode of production. It’s a mode of 
power.”  
To me, it is clear that capitalism is both a mode of production and a mode of power. The 
extensive fact is that both activities are intrinsic to its overall operations. Imagine we asked a 
question about bees. Are bees producers of honey or pollinators of flowers? The answer is that 
they are both. Both functions are intrinsic to their overall activities. One activity is an interme-
diate goal (the final goal being feeding young for reproduction purposes) and the other activity 
produces a byproduct service from the point of view of wider ecology. A person may focus on 
the study of one activity or the other but a study focus should not mean that one overlooks the 
wider system embedded nature of the activity or process being studied. 
I suspect the issue is really a definitional one. If one defines, or at least closely identifies, 
capitalism with the operations of financial capital then capital itself will appear as a mode of 
power. But it is only the proximal source of power. Ownership, symbolically signified and 
proved at law by possession of nominal quantities (shares and dollars), is the legitimation for 
manipulating real quantities. Ownership in turn is backed by state laws and the state’s monop-
oly on violence. Violence, real, implicit or threatened, is always the final underwriter of (po-
litical and biological) power. 
In one important way, Bichler and Nitzan follow Veblen in dividing economic activity 
into industry (actual production) and business (buying, selling, manipulating and even sabo-
taging industry). This too is a useful way of looking at things. These different methods of look-
ing at capitalism are prisms to view it through. They split capitalism up in different ways into 
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different apparent constituent components. But after all reductionist analysis, the key is to put 
a model of the whole system back together conceptually. This is the most difficult task and 
perhaps even impossible for a truly complex system. 
One component of capitalism which must not be forgotten is the state. The state too is a 
component of capitalism and (paradoxically perhaps) statist activity heavily underwrites oli-
garchic capitalism. The rule of (capitalist-favouring) law, backed by the state’s monopoly on 
violence, is a key component of capitalism. State subsidies also underwrite capitalism, or a 
least our current form of capitalism. Most successful, established, capital intensive industries, 
even when in private hands, are heavily underwritten by state subsidies. We only have to look 
at fossil fuels (massive subsidies), industrial agriculture (massive subsidies), banks (massive 
subsidies), armaments production (massive subsidies). This conformation of state activity to 
the interests of large capitalist holdings (big government to big business) probably explains 
why China finally made the transition to “statist capitalism” so easily. It’s a natural fit under 
the current system. 
 
